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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JAMES KOROBAS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JAMES A. HENDERSON, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 8636 
The action below was for breach of a construction contract. 
Plaintiff has appealed from a judgment of no cause of action 
dated and entered January 14, 1957 (R. 60). 
No proof was adduced at the trial; this appeal is based 
primarily upon the pleadings and rulings of the Court tnade 
at a pre-trial conference and a pro forma trial. 
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On March 25, 1952 the appellant and respondent entered 
into a written contract by the terms of which the respondent 
entered into a written contract by the terms of which the 
respondent was to construct for appellant a building at Eighth 
East and Third South Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 1, 
par. 2; R. 10, par. 2) . It was to be a store building consisting 
of four storerooms, built according to the plans and specifica-
tions prepared by a named engineer (R. 4, par. 1). The contract 
price was $29,600.00 (R. 6, Par. 17), subject to change if prices 
charged by sub-contractors were changed (R. 36, 65). 
The complaint enumerated defects in workmanship and 
variations in the plans of the building as finally completed 
by the respondent (R. 2). The first defense was that final 
payment had been made by the appellant to the respondent 
on December 5, 1952, and that this payment constituted ac-
ceptance of the building and conclusion of the contract (R. 8). 
The same defense included a contention that by the terms of 
paragraph 23 (R. 6) the appellant's sole remedy for faulty 
workmanship and materials was "stopping the job or taking 
possession of t'he work or supplying satisfactory materials or 
workmen as the job progressed.'· The defense alluded to 
paragraph 15 (R. 5) of the contract but did not contend that 
the terms of that paragraph barred the present action. 
On November 2, 1956, a pre-trial conference \vas held 
before Hon. A. H. Ellett, Judge of the Third Judical District 
Court (R. _)2). At that conference the action against one of 
the original defendants, General Casualty Company of America, 
\\'~ts disrnisscd ( R. 5)), ~1nd the dismissal is not at issue in this 
~•ppeal. H()\vcvcr, the court also concluded that the action of 
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appellant against respondent was barred by ~he prov1s1ons 
of Paragraph 15 of the contract and that appellant could not 
recover, as a matter of law, for any defects except those which 
\Vere latent at the time of final payment (R. 39, 45). The court 
also decided, as a matter of law, which defects were latent 
(R. 39-43). A trial was conducted on November 29, 1956 
(R. 48), at which time the respondent tendered to appellant 
the amount of $13 7.60 as payment for the items listed in Para-
graph 4.A. 7 and 4.A.9 of the complaint (R. 48). The appellant 
accepted the tender, but without waiving any rights as to any 
other injuries (R. 49). The court having indicated that recovery 
for all patent defects was barred by Paragraph 15, and that 
it would sustain objections to any evidence relating to· patent 
defects (R. 51), the appellant rested his case (R. 50). 
Paragraph 25 of the contract (R. 7) provided for recovery 
of costs and a reasonable attorney's fee expended by a party 
in enforcement of the contract. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The Court's interpretation of Paragraph 15 of the 
contract as prohibiting recovery for patent defects was erro-
neous. 
2. The Court erred in ruling as a matter of law that certain 
defects were patent and others latent. 
3. 'rhc Court erred iu failing to award to plaintiff a 
reasonable attorney's fee for enforcement of the contract. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPH 
15 OF THE CONTRACT AS PROHIBITING RECOVERY 
FOR PATENT DEFECTS WAS ERRONEOUS. 
It is elementary that a cause of action for damages arises 
upon breach of a contract, and that the obligation to pay 
damages is law-imposed. 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, § 388; 9 Am. 
Jur ., Building and Construction Contracts, § 116. The action 
in the present case was not directly involved with conditions, 
whether precedent or subsequent, but was an action for failure 
to perform as promised. 
The Court below held that notwithstanding the breach 
the plaintiff could not recover his damages. The ruling ,vas 
based upon a construction of Paragraph 15 of the contract 
(R. 5, 59), which provides: 
''If ei~her party to this Contract shall suffer damage 
in any manner because of any \vrongful act or neglect 
of the other party or of anyone employed by him, then 
he shall be reimbursed by the other party for such 
damage. Claims under this clause shall be made in 
writing to the party liable \vithin a reasonable time at 
the first observance of such damage and not later than 
the time of final payment. except as expressly stipulated 
other,vise in the case of faulty \Vork or materials, and 
shall be adjusted by agreement or arbitration." 
The trial court construed the above paragraph as being a 
general non-claim provision functioning to prohibit claims 
not only for '" rongful acts and neglects but for failure to 
perforn1 the work required by the contract or for performing it 
othenvise than as required by the contract. The paragraph 
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does not purport to be that broad. A breakdown of the pro-
vision shows the court's construction to have been erroneous. 
The first sentence requires ( (reimbursement'' under certain 
circumstances. ((Reimbursement" is not generally used in re-
ferring to rights of action for breach of contract; it has been 
defined as meaning ({to pay back" or to ({make return or 
restoration of an equivalent for something paid, expended, 
or lost" or to ({indemnify" Black's Law Dictionary ( 3rd Ed.) 
1520. Damages for breach of contract are not based upon 
indemnification but upon a difference in the value of the per-
formance promised and that given. 
The paragraph requires reimbursement for any ({wrongful 
act or neglect." The word ({wrong" has been stated to signify, 
in . its most usual sense, ( (an in jury committed to the person 
or property of another, or to his relative rights unconnected 
with contract." Black's Law Dictionary (3rd Ed.) 1862. 
((Neglect" is ordinarily used in connection with tortious con-
duct. Although it is true that the parties are probably liable 
for their wrongful acts or neglects in any event, the sentence 
broadens the common law liabilities of the parties by making 
them guarantors of the conduct of persons employed by them. 
The first sentence defines the contractual right; in so doing 
it makes no reference to faulty workmanship or materials. If 
it stood alone it would be clear that it was not intended to 
limit the time within which action might be brought for failure 
to perform the construction work as promised. The second 
sentence, however, reads as follows: 
f(Claitns under this clause shall be made in writing 
to the party liable within a reasonable time at the first 
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observance of such damage and not later than the time 
of final payment, except as expressly stipulated other-
wise in the case of faulty work or materials, and shall 
be adjusted by agreement or arbitration." (R. 5.) 
The court below must have interpreted this sentence as 
broadening the meaning of ((wrongful act" and "neglect" so 
as to bring within the operation of those words the type of 
default referred to in the exception. The clause is somewhat 
similar to the one involved in Employerl Liability Assur. 
Corp., Ltd., v. Morrow ( 6 Cir. 1906), 143 Fed. 750. In that 
case an insurance contract contained a number of clauses setting 
out the compensation to be paid for various injuries. One of 
the clauses contained the following exception: 
''Except in the case of a claim consequent on the 
death of the assured or loss of the sight of both eyes 
or of the loss of two entire limbs." 
It \vas argued that this exception made the proviso in which 
it appeared repugnant to a previous clause. Said the court: 
''If this exception had been omitted, the provision 
could not possibly have applied to the cases mentioned 
in the exception. The exception did not, therefore, 
operate to take out of the proviso something '"hich, 
but for the exception, \Yould have been included. Its 
presence, therefore, cannot under such circumstances 
bring within the proviso a claim ''"hich would not have 
been "' ithin the proviso if the exception had been 
omitted. The ordinary office of an exception or proviso 
is to take special cases out of a general class or to guard 
against misinterpretation. Experience shows, however, 
that they quite frequently are introduced from excessive 
caution, in sud1 cases operating only to bring confusion. 
'l'hcrc is th) .~eneral rule requiring that t:\'ery other 
l'Ll itn nr subject of the same general class as those 
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excepted out shall be regarded as embraced in the 
general words of the contract or law unless the general 
language of the writing leaves it doubtful whether 
the matters named in the exception would have other-
wise been within the general terms of the law." 
It has been stated ~hat the proper use of a proviso or 
exception is nto qualify what is already affirmed or except 
something from inclusion therein, but not to enlarge." Solomon 
v. Neisner Bros., Inc. (1950), 93 F. Supp. 311, 318; affirmed 
187 F.2d 735. Also, that the nordinary office of an exception 
or a proviso is to take out of a contract that which otherwise 
\vould have been included in it, or to guard against misinter-
pretation." 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 343; Sears v. Cbilds (1941), 
35 N.E. 2d 663, 309 Mass. 357. 
As construed by the trial court the exception in Paragraph 
15 excepted nothing; it broadened the meaning of c cwrongful 
act" or nneglect" to include failure of performance of the 
contract, or, rather, so much of failure of performance of ~he 
contract as was latent at the time of final payment. The court 
looked at the exception as if it had been thrown into the contract 
by someone who didn't know what was coming next, and 
wanted the clause to a void repugnancy in event there was a 
provision somewhere else in the contract relating to n faulty 
work or materials." Such an assumption might be legitimate 
in the case of complicated Government contracts in which 
typed special provisions are added to printed general provi-
sions; but it is not legitimate where the entire contract is put 
together as one typed document. At the time of signing the 
contract the parties must have known that there was no express 
stipulation elsewhere in the contract governing the time within 
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which a claim for tcfaulty work and materials" had to be made. 
They must have intended the clause to have some. effect; and 
if the only effect intended was to broaden t'he meaning of 
((wrongful act" and ((neglect" the parties chose a circuitous 
route indeed. Nor is it reasonable to assume that they were 
providing for some sort of future stipulation, since they could 
have amended any part of the contract at any later time. 
In accordance with the rules announced by the authorities 
above cited, we believe Paragraph 15 must be construed as 
applying only to conduct of the tort type, with the exception 
added for the purpose of avoiding misinterpretation. That its 
purpose misfired is no reason to ignore the purpose. By treating 
the exception only as an exception both the law of semantics 
and the parties' reasonable exception emerge intact. 
The trial court's ruling was made without consideration 
of any testimony and should not have the weight of a finding 
of fact. Interpretation and construction of the contract is a 
question of law in this instance and should be so treated by the 
court. We recognize, of course, that facts may have a bearing 
u pan the interpretation of the contract, and would have been 
prepared to show, for instance, that Paragraph 15 is the same 
as Article 31 of the standard contract used by the American 
Institute of Architects (See 2 Nichols Encyc. of Legal Forms, 
Building and Construction Contracts, par. 2.1071, p. 283 ), 
that in the A.I.A. contract the paragraph has not been used 
to apply to faulty \\'Orkmanship and materials (2 Id. 280, Art. 
20) ; and that the defendant is a man of experience in the 
construction and rontracting business. 
At the pre-trial it \vas adn1itted by the plaintiff that the 
10 
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contract in question was drawn by a scr1vener employed by 
plaintiff (R. 38). Because of this admission the court apparently 
concluded that the rule of contra proferentem justified it in 
construing the contract ((against the plaintiff." It has been 
stated that the rule is primarily a rule of policy to protect the 
underdog ( 3 Corbin on Contracts 154) and that it should not 
be applied until the court has had ({recourse to every aid, rule 
or cannon of construction to ascertain the intention of the 
parties." Reese Howell Co. v. Brown ( 1916), 48 Utah 142, 
158 Pac. 684. As applied in this case, where there was neither 
underdog nor recourse, the rule becomes merely a device for 
punishing the inartistic. 
This deserves reiteration: This action is for breach of the 
very performance that was the subject matter of the contract. 
We are not dealing with a collateral provision the breach of 
which \vas technical only. To apply Paragraph 15 as an absolute 
statute of limitations (and not a reasonable one, at that) is 
to deprive the plaintiff of the right to get what he paid for. 
On the other hand, by treating the exception as an exception 
the defendant is not prejudiced. If the plaintiff accepted the 
tuilding with knowledge of the defects the defendant has 
protection in the doctrines of waiver and acquiescence. 9 Am. 
Jur., Building and Construction Contracts, § 52 et seq.; Re-
statement of Contracts § 411; 3 Williston on Contracts (Rev. 
Ed.) § 724. But these doctrines involve factual matter that 
should not be the basis of a pre-trial ruling. 
11 
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II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER OF 
LAW THAT CERTAIN DEFECTS WERE PATENT AND 
OTHERS LATENT. 
In interpreting Paragraph 15 the court distinguished be-
tween ((patent" and ((latent" defects. The contract itself does 
not intimate that any different treatment was intended for 
the two types of defects; the distinction was apparently made 
because of the decision of this court in Kansas City Wholes ale 
Groc. Co. v. Weber Packing Corp. (1937), 93 Utah 414, 73 
P.2d 1272. That case, however, was concerned with a clause 
containing an unequivocal non-claim provision; the Court 
refused to give it validity in the case of patent defects. We 
submit that the failure to make any distinction in the contract 
is another reason for construing the clause as not applying to 
faulty workmanship and materials. 
Assuming t'he clause does apply to faulty workmanship and 
materials, the Court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that 
some defects were patent and others latent. It frequently has 
been stated that latent defects are those which would not have 
been discovered by a reasonable inspection. It is our position 
that the question of what is a nreasonable examination" is a 
question of fact depending upon the circumstances of the 
case. We do not believe that there is anything in the ((nature" 
of certain defects \vhich permits us to say that they are patent 
or latent. The plaintiff should have been permitted to show 
\vhat the circumstances were and what type of inspection would 
have hrcn necessary to discover the defects. The Ka11Jas (il'V 
ll" holesrde Gro(t)ry case, supra, at page 1275 of the Pacific 
12 
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Reporter, shows the extent to which circumstances are important 
in determining whether a defect is patent or latent. 
We do not believe that an incorrectly sloping roof-
particularly where the slope called for is slight-is any more 
patent than mold in ketchup. 
III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD TO 
PLAINTIFF A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE FOR 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CONTRACT. 
Paragraph 25 of the contract (R. 7) provides: 
v' "Should any party to this Agreement breach any of 
the terms, conditions and provisions therein contained 
then in that event the party found guilty of such breach 
or violation shall pay to the other costs incurred to-
gether with a reasonable attorney's fee that may be 
expended in enforcing the contract." 
The court found as a fact (R. 60) that on November 29, 
1956, the day of the trial, the defendant tendered and plaintiff 
accepted $13 7.20 as full settlement of two of the claimed 
defects ruled to have been latent. At the pre-trial it was agreed 
that reasonable attorney's fee in case of trial was three hundred 
dollars (R. 47). 
The defendant's tender not having been made until the 
time of trial, the plaintiff was entitled to costs and attorney's 
fees incurred prior to that time unless counsel's action at the 
trial rnay be interpreted as a waiver of any right to costs 
(R. 49). In any event, there was no waiver of attorney's fee. 
13 
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Such fee having been shown to be payable it should have been 
awarded whether asked for in the prayer or not. Rule 54 (c) 
( 1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
The contract between plaintiff and defendant was silent 
as to the time within whiCh claims are required to be made 
for faulty workmanship or materials. This being so, the only 
bar is the statute of limitations; and the present action was 
brought before the statute had run. Although there may be 
an issue as to acceptance of the building with knowledge of the 
defects, that is a factual issue upon whiCh the plaintiff is en-
titled to a trial. It is submitted that the court below committed 
error; and that by virtue of the error plaintiff was deprived 
of his day in court. The judgment should be reversed and the 
case remanded for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYCE E. ROE 
of Clyde & Mecham 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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